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Latin AmericaIn this paper we investigate opportunities for energy technology deployment under climate change mitigation ef-
forts in Latin America. Through several carbon tax and CO2 abatement scenarios until 2050 we analyze what re-
sources and technologies, notably for electricity generation, could be cost-optimal in the energy sector to
signiﬁcantly reduce CO2 emissions in the region. By way of sensitivity test we perform a cross-model comparison
study and inspectwhether robust conclusions can be drawn across results fromdifferentmodels aswell as different
types of models (general versus partial equilibrium). Given the abundance of biomass resources in Latin America,
they play a large role in energy supply in all scenarios we inspect. This is especially true for stringent climate policy
scenarios, for instance because the use of biomass in power plants in combination with CCS can yield negative CO2
emissions. We ﬁnd that hydropower, which today contributes about 800 TWh to overall power production in Latin
America, could be signiﬁcantly expanded tomeet the climate policieswe investigate, typically by about 50%, but po-
tentially by as much as 75%. According to all models, electricity generation increases exponentially with a two- to
three-fold expansion between2010 and 2050.Weﬁnd that in our climate policy scenarios renewable energy overall
expands typically at double-digit growth rates annually, but there is substantial spread in model results for speciﬁc
options such aswind and solar power: the climate policies thatwe simulate raisewind power in 2050 on average to
half the production level that hydropower provides today, while they raise solar power to either a substantially
higher or a much lower level than hydropower supplies at present, depending on which model is used. Also for
CCS we observe large diversity in model outcomes, which reﬂects the uncertainties with regard to its future imple-
mentation potential as a result of the challenges this CO2 abatement technology experiences. The extent to which
different mitigation options can be used in practice varies greatly between countries within Latin America, depend-
ing on factors such as resource potentials, economic performance, environmental impacts, and availability of tech-
nical expertise. We provide concise assessments of possible deployment opportunities for some low-carbon
energy options, for the region at large and with occasional country-level detail in speciﬁc cases.
© 2016 Battelle Memorial Institute and the Authors. Published by ELSEVIER B.V. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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d the Authors. Published by EL1. Introduction
TheCLIMACAP-LAMPproject investigated, among others, the energy
technologies needed in Latin America for the region to contribute to
global climate change control. Themain tools of the research teams con-
tributing to this project – energy–economy, integrated assessment and/
or energy system models that serve studying the energy-economicSEVIER B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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determining the extent, direction and cost of the technological change
necessary to signiﬁcantly abate emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs).We inspect in this article howmuch technological change is re-
quired, in the short- to mid-term (i.e. until 2050), if countries in Latin
America adopt, for example, carbon taxes or abatement targets to stim-
ulate GHG emission reductions. We examine which energy options
should be reduced, as well as how fast, and which others need to be ex-
panded, and atwhat scale, in a similarway as has recently been done on
the global scale in e.g. Wilson et al. (2012), Riahi et al. (2013) and van
der Zwaan et al. (2013b). We do not assess what the direct implemen-
tation costs would be of the technological transformation associated
with climate change mitigation action in Latin America, as was done
in some previous studies (see e.g. McCollum et al., 2013). For an inspec-
tion of the investment requirements associatedwith climate-mitigating
technological change in Latin Americawe refer to another publication in
this special issue (Kober et al., 2015).
With our analysis we connect to a growing body of literature on en-
ergy system transition pathways, in particular those that involve renew-
able formsof energy (see e.g. GEA, 2012; IPCC, 2011). Given our focus on
Latin America, ourwork also pertains to the UN's Sustainable Energy for
All initiative (UN, 2012), evenwhilewe here donot explicitly nor exten-
sively assess energy transformation in relation to economic develop-
ment. Technology transformation pathways have recently been
studied in a number of publications, both at the global level (such as
in Krey et al., 2014; Weyant and Kriegler, 2014) and regional level
(Calvin et al., 2012; Clarke et al., 2012, for Asia; Clarke et al., 2014a,
2014b; Fawcett et al., 2014, for the USA; Knopf et al., 2013, for
Europe). In this paperwe attempt to put ourwork on energy technology
transitions in Latin America into a broader perspective, by comparing it
to the existing literature on the subject matter and by reﬂecting on
questions like how the decarbonization scenarios presented here differ
from (or are similar to) those reported in the literature. We investigate
whether possible technology transformation pathways for Latin
America have commonalities or dissimilarities with those in other re-
gions. Likewise, we are interested in knowing whether our results are
similar or not to those obtained for the energy system transition required
at a world-scale, in the context of which we inspect the global average
perspective provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(see Clarke et al., 2014a, 2014b; IPCC, 2014). Other publications in this
special issue also present narratives on how the CLIMACAP-LAMP ﬁnd-
ings relate to the literature on transition pathways and climate
policy, such as notably Clarke et al. (2016). In this paper we also
inspect the reasons for differences in technology roll-out that we observe
across models, some of which relate to structural differences between
models, others to different parameter assumptions (see e.g. Kriegler
et al., 2014a, 2014b, who present results of extensive analysis in an effort
to do the same through novel work on the basis of diagnostic indicators).
None of the energy technological transformation questions we raise
can be answered with certainty, but integrated assessment models (as
used for essentially all of the previously mentioned studies) can take
away some of the uncertainties, in addition to help understanding
some of the key drivers of technology developments in view of the
strong linkages within the energy systems: the beneﬁt of using a set of
differentmodels, aswe do in this study, is that the diversity in their out-
comes may be indicative for the nature of the technological change that
needs to be initiated in the energy system. In this articlewe focusmostly
on the energy sector and CO2 as contributor to climate change, since
sectors like agriculture and emissions of other GHGs (e.g. from
AFOLU1: agriculture, forestry and land-use) are investigated in other
contributions to this special issue (see e.g. Calvin et al., 2016). We par-
ticularly zoom in on electricity generation, as in developing countries
(and especially in Latin America), this sector is likely to grow fast over
the decades to come, with a two- to three-fold expansion between1 Previously referred to as LULUCF: land-use, land-use change and forestry.today and 2050 (see for example IEA-ETP, 2012, 2014). A number of re-
cent studies have shown that the decarbonization of non-electric energy
supply, such as in the transport sector and industry, poses crucial chal-
lenges for low atmospheric CO2 concentration stabilization, since either
fewer technology options exist or low-carbon technologies abound but
are more expensive than for electricity generation (see e.g., Krey et al.,
2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a, 2014b; Luderer et al., 2012; Rösler et al.,
2014; van der Zwaan et al., 2013a). A detailed inspection of these other
sectors, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper. In Section 2
of this paper we brieﬂy introduce the methodology used for our work,
list themodels onwhich our research results are based, and concisely de-
scribe the scenarios thatwe investigated. Section 3 reports ourmain ﬁnd-
ings in several subsections dedicated, respectively, to (1) CO2 emissions,
(2) primary energy supply (including fossil and renewable resources),
(3) electricity production (overall tendencies and fossil fuelled power
plants versus alternative options such as nuclear energy or renewables
like hydro, solar andwindpower), (4) the potential expansionof CO2 cap-
ture and storage (CCS), (5) energy efﬁciency, and (6) short-term technol-
ogy deployment implications, as applied to Latin America. In Section 4we
discuss our results, draw some conclusions and formulate several recom-
mendations for stakeholders in the public and private sectors.
2. Models and scenario design
The features of the integrated assessment models used in this tech-
nology diffusion comparison analysis varywidely: some are of a general
equilibrium type, while others are partial equilibrium models; they in-
clude different simulation and/or optimization routines; they vary in
terms of technological detail, diversity and inclusiveness in the energy
system, as well as technical and (macro-)economic parameter assump-
tions; they are distinct with regards to the way in which they represent
technological change, endogenously or exogenously; they differ with
regard to assumptions on land-use emissions and greenhouse gas spe-
cies; they are diverse vis-à-vis assumed natural resource availabilities
and prices, such as of fossil fuels (but also e.g. CO2 storage options); et
cetera (see also van der Zwaan et al., 2013b). For detailed model de-
scriptions we refer to publications by their respective modeling teams:
EPPA (Paltsev et al., 2005); GCAM (Calvin et al., 2011); Phoenix (Sue
Wing et al., 2011); POLES (Criqui et al., in press; Kitous et al., 2010);
TIAM-ECN (Rösler et al., 2014; van der Zwaan et al., 2013a) and TIAM-
WORLD (Loulou, 2008; Loulou and Labriet, 2008).
A multi-model comparison study of technology diffusion for Latin
America under climate change measures can involve investigating
many possible aspects of technological change. Our focus is ﬁrst on
the options available for the primary energy mix, in order to compre-
hend the dynamics behind themain energy resources required if the re-
gion adopts climate change mitigation policies. We particularly
investigate electricity production. The reason for choosing this sector
is that it represents a rapidly growing GHG emitting sector, which
may in some respects be more easily adaptable to (partial or complete)
decarbonization than someother sectors, while it can contribute toGHG
emission reductions in these other sectors by their electriﬁcation
(IEA-ETP, 2012; IPCC, 2014). Also, other sectors and emissions associat-
edwith AFOLU, that are particularly relevant for Latin America, are stud-
ied in other contributions to this special issue from theCLIMACAP-LAMP
research project (see Calvin et al., 2016).We inspect the behavior under
carbon taxes and emission reduction targets of a broad range of differ-
ent energy technologies, including high-carbon coal, oil and natural
gas-based electricity, as well as low-carbon nuclear, hydro, solar and
wind-based power (while leaving biomass-based options for Calvin
et al., 2016). We thus try to answer how and how fast the transition
maymaterialize from fossil to non-fossil energy options. We also assess
the potential widespread use of CCS, because this technology could pro-
long the use of fossil fuels in an emissions-constrained world and is
hoped to play an important role in reaching ambitious climate change
control, either as bridging technology or not.
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speciﬁedbelow.2 For articleswithmore detailed descriptions of these sce-
narios, we refer to van der Zwaan et al. (2016) who present an overview
of this special issue, as well as van Ruijven et al. (2015) and Clarke et al.
(2016)whoprovide extensive narratives for the Core baseline respective-
ly a diverse set of policy scenarios. In the CLIMACAP-LAMPprojectwe also
investigated an alternative to the (business-as-usual) Core baseline sce-
nario, the Policy baseline, which is similar to the former but with the im-
portant difference that it also includes climate and energy policies
enacted or proposed since the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties held in
December 2009 (hence comprising the so-called “Copenhagen pledges”).
Accounting for these energy and climate policies may for some models
have a signiﬁcant impact on indicators such as CO2 emissions and the
level of primary energy consumption until 2050, while for other models
it has only a moderate effect. For a detailed analysis of the Policy baseline
we refer to Clarke et al. (2016). The Low CO2 price scenario differs from
the High CO2 price scenario in that the former generates much lower dif-
fusion of low-carbon energy technologies than the latter, while being ap-
proximately similar in terms of e.g. the type of energy technologies
deployed; we ﬁnd that a comparison between the two yields little addi-
tional insight for the ways in which climate changemitigation can be im-
plemented, so that we only show results for the former in one instance
and restrict ourselves to inspecting the High CO2 price scenario in all
other cases. The Low CO2 price scenario yields a CO2 emission pathway
that is only somewhat (typically around 10%) below the one we ﬁnd for
the Core baseline scenario (while the technologymix anddiffusion trends
remain largely unaltered), which constitutes another reason for leaving a
more detailed inspection of the Low CO2 price scenario to several of the
country-speciﬁc papers in this special issue (that includes studies on
Argentina (Di Sbroiavacca et al., 2016), Brazil (Lucena et al., 2016),
Colombia (Calderon et al., 2016) and Mexico (Veysey et al., 2016)).C
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avaore baseline:The database con
e CLIMACAP-LAM
ilable at https://tnBusiness-as-usual scenario including climate and energy
policies enacted prior to 2010.w CO2 price: A carbon tax is levied of 10 $/tCO2e in 2020, growing at a rate of
4%/yr to reach 32$/tCO2e in 2050.igh CO2 price: A carbon tax is levied of 50 $/tCO2e in 2020, growing at a rate of
4%/yr to reach 162$/tCO2e in 2050.0% abatement
(FF&I):Fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions are reduced by 5% in
2020, linearly increasing to 20% in 2050, w.r.t. 2010.0% abatement
(FF&I):Fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions are reduced by 12.5% in
2020, linearly increasing to 50% in 2050, w.r.t. 2010.The characteristics of the models we use determine to signiﬁcant ex-
tent the nature of their outcome. In Table 1 we therefore summarize the
main features, representations and assumptions of the six models
employed in our cross-model comparison study, in an attempt to clarify
some of our ﬁndings. We refer to the model references for more speciﬁc
assumptions on technology costs, substitution elasticities and other such
variables. In the remainder of our paper we refer to the characteristics
listed in Table 1 in order to try to advance our understanding and state-
of-the-art knowledge of how variations in model outcomes can be ex-
plained on the basis of structural differences between models and/or di-
verse parameter assumptions (as also done, for example, in Kriegler
et al., 2014a, 2014b). Table 1 is sub-divided in three major parts: basic
model features, representation of key regional resources, and expansion
and share constraints for key technologies and representation of techno-
logical change. Themain clusters of energy technologies are listed, partic-
ularly as related to power production. These include especially both
biomass and non-biomass based renewables, since they are likely to
play a key role in the climate change mitigation policies that we investi-
gate. For solar energy, for instance, it is indicatedwhether amodel distin-
guishes between PV and CSP,while forwind energy possible distinction is
mentioned between turbines built onshore and offshore (see Table 1,taining the output of these scenario runs, for all models contributing
P project, aswell as a documentwith full scenario details, is publicly
tcat.iiasa.ac.at/CLIMACAP-LAMPDB/.under the rows “Solar (power supply)” and “Wind (power supply)”). Par-
ticularly important for a paper like this one is whether biomass energy in
combination with CCS (referred to as BECCS or BioCCS) is represented,
and whether models assume the availability for BioCCS for both electric
and non-electric energy supply or, alternatively, only for power plants
(see Table 1, which provides biomass-related details under the rows
“Bioenergy”, “CO2 storage supplies” and “CCS”). For a description of all
other biomass-related model assumptions we refer to Calvin et al.
(2016) in this special issue.
3. Results
3.1. CO2 emissions
In the upper left plot of Fig. 1 we see that all models agree, with a
high level of consistency, that in a business-as-usual scenario CO2 emis-
sions are likely to substantially increase over the next 3–4 decades in
Latin America, possibly by about a factor of two between today and
2050. We also observe that the climate mitigation programs designed
under the 20% and 50% (FF&I) abatement scenarios reduce emissions
in 2050 by about 60% respectively 75% with respect to that year's CO2
emission levels in the Core baseline, as demonstrated by the lower
two plots in Fig. 1. Note that for the years 2000 and 2010 historical
data are shown, but for some models 2010 is actually a modeled year
rather than a historical exogenous input parameter. Differences in
base year are discussed in van Ruijven et al. (2015). This, alongwith dif-
ferences in data sources, explains the spread between the linear down-
ward sloping lines until the middle of the century (lower plots). As the
20% and 50% abatement panels of Fig. 1 clearly demonstrate, the base
year spread of CO2 emissions is around 300 MtCO2, i.e. some 20% of
base year emissions, for various deﬁnitional and data source reasons.
This is a non-trivial amount that should be born inmind for interpreting
other ﬁndings in this paper (see van Ruijven et al., 2015, and the nation-
al contributions to this Special Issue). While the models are in agree-
ment that the implementation of a high CO2 price substantially
reduces the CO2 emissions path in comparison to that modeled in the
Core baseline, from the upper right plot of Fig. 1 it is clear that these
models react quite differently under the same carbon taxation intro-
duced in the High CO2 price scenario.
For two models (EPPA and Phoenix) emissions continue to increase
until 2050 in spite of this taxation, whereas for two other models
(POLES and TIAM-ECN) a downward trend kicks in around 2030–2040.
For GCAM emissions dive deeply from the beginning, which results par-
ticularly from the large presumed potential for the implementation of
CCS technology in combination with both fossil fuels and biomass. For
the speciﬁc case of Brazil these large emission reductions are mostly
achieved through BioCCS, that is, biomass used as feedstock in power
plants that are equipped with CCS (see Lucena et al., 2016). Fig. 14 in
the Appendix shows the CO2 price development for our two emission
abatement scenarios. With this Figure the carbon prices (or CO2 emission
certiﬁcate prices) for these scenarios can be directly compared to those in
our two carbon tax scenarios, while Fig. 1 allows for comparing the emis-
sion reductions achieved in all of them. As can be seen, the CO2 prices in
the 20% abatement (FF&I) scenario are signiﬁcantly higher than those in
the High CO2 price scenario for at least several of the models (see also
Clarke et al., 2016, in this special issue for more information on this com-
parison). For this and following ﬁgures the blue shading represents a sub-
jective measure of realism formulated collectively by the authors, that is,
scenarios that we judge either unlikely or not matching the majority of
other models we exclude from the shading.
3.2. Primary energy and savings (supply side)
The difference between adopting a low or high carbon tax scheme
over the forthcomingdecades is likely to be signiﬁcant in termsof primary
energy consumption, according to essentially allmodels, as can be seen in
529B. van der Zwaan et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 526–542the two upper plots of Fig. 2.3 In these upper two plots the Low and High
CO2 price scenarios are compared with the Core baseline: only small dif-
ferences are observed in terms of energy consumption between the
Core baseline scenario and the Low CO2 price scenario, while quite sub-
stantial differences emerge when comparing the Core baseline scenario
with theHigh CO2 price scenario. Evenwith the carbon taxation as elevat-
ed as in the high CO2 price scenario we see that all models agree that pri-
mary energy consumption is higher in 2050 than it is today, sometimes
even substantially higher. The spread in results, however, is rather
large:while somemodelsﬁnd an increase from30EJ primary energy con-
sumption today to close to 40 EJ in 2050, othermodels yield an increase to
close to 80 EJ over this time span. The difference between modeling out-
comes in terms of primary energy consumption can be explained, among
others, by varying assumptions with regards to demographics, economic
growth and the implementation of energy efﬁciency and savings
measurements.
As can be seen from Fig. 2, with high carbon taxation a divergence
becomes apparent between two clusters of models, technology-rich
partial equilibrium energy systems models (GCAM, POLES, TIAM-ECN
and TIAM-WORLD) and general equilibrium economy-environment
models (EPPA and Phoenix). The latter two react much more strongly
to the introduction of CO2 pricing as a result of price elasticities included
in these models as well as tax-induced (endogenous) reductions of
overall production hence GDP (that lower energy demand), while the
former yield a more conservative reaction given their explicit and de-
tailed account of many energy technologies and their (often elevated)
costs (as alternatively expressed through marginal abatement cost
curves, or MACCs; see e.g. McKinsey, 2009). Also, unlike the latter, the
former do not include endogenous GDP effects, since they are not gen-
eral equilibrium models (see Table 1). If one replaces the high carbon
taxation with either of the two CO2 emission reduction schemes as de-
signed under the two abatement scenarios (see the lower two plots of
Fig. 2), then we see a similar shift in primary energy consumption in
comparison to the Core baseline scenario as in the high CO2 price case.
For the two general equilibrium models, however, the reduction in en-
ergy consumption becomes even more signiﬁcant: for EPPA and Phoe-
nix we see energy consumption falling to 25–30 EJ and 35–40 EJ,
respectively, in 2050. It is interesting to see that the changes projected
in the 50% abatement scenario are not very different from those in the
20% abatement scenario, which means that additional mitigation in
the former in comparison to the latter is realized in secondary and
ﬁnal sectors (e.g. through CCS deployment, as we see in Fig. 4). Fig. 3,
which reports for the High CO2 price scenario and the 20% and 50%
abatement (FF&I) scenarios the primary energy savings realized over
time (with regard to the business-as-usual scenario) under three differ-
ent types of climate change mitigation regimes, also visualizes the clus-
tering between the two main types of models. For the general
equilibrium oriented models energy savings amounting to 40–60% in
2050 are common, while for the energy systems models 10–20% turns
out to be a ceiling for most of this half-century. Diversity exists also
within the category of technology-rich energy system models: in the
abatement scenarios GCAM and TIAM-World yield energy savings of
nomore than 10%,while POLES and TIAM-ECN generate primary energy
consumption reductions of asmuch as 20%, as a result of differences be-
tween these models in energy (saving) technology cost assumptions.
Fig. 4 reports for all models in the Core baseline and three climate
policy scenarios the total level of primary energy consumption in Latin
America in 2050, as well as its breakdown by type of energy resource.
As one can see, all models agree that in the business-as-usual case fossil
fuels continue to dominate energy supply until themiddle of the century.3 Total primary energy was calculated on a 1:1 basis for energy vs. electricity, as ex-
plained in the text accompanying our database (https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/CLIMACAP-
LAMPDB/). For an inspection of energy accounting method caveats, including ambiguities
in the treatment of e.g. renewables versus nuclear energy in this respect, see Macknick
(2011).Under a low carbon tax regime (as in the Low CO2 price scenario), the
primary energy consumption pattern observed in the upper left plot of
Fig. 4 is not much altered, that is, the energy mix does not change by a
signiﬁcant extent, in particular with regard to the demand for fossil
fuels. When high carbon taxes are imposed (like in the High CO2 price
scenario), however, their use is curtailed in relative terms and, especially,
in absolute terms (see the numbers indicated above the histograms). In
most cases, we observe that the use of fossil fuels is also complemented
with CCS technology, especially for natural gas and coal. Themain differ-
ence between the two abatement scenarios is the extent to which CCS is
deployed, while the relative shares of the main energy resources remain
little affected. The reason that EPPA and Phoenix have a greater share of
fossils fuelswithout CCS in the energymix is that these CGEmodels have
much lower overall primary energy supply than in the other 4 models
(as we observed in Fig. 2). The use of oil is not necessarily reduced in
relative terms, and it is little complementedwith CCS, because of its con-
tinued importance in particularly the transport sector (where CCS is not
directly implementable). Several models, especially GCAM, yield sub-
stantial roles for the combination of CCS and biomass, which can yield
negative GHG emissions and thereby compensate for emissions in
other sectors where GHG abatement is more difﬁcult and costly. The
combination of CCS with biomass is particularly pertinent for Latin
America, given the abundance of biomass resources in the region
(which is visualized in all four plots of Fig. 4). All models suggest that es-
pecially (but not only) in all of the three climate policy scenarios hydro-
power plays a substantial role in total energy supply (between close to
10% up to 20%), which is justiﬁed on the basis of the large hydro poten-
tials available in especially the Southern American continent.
3.3. Electricity production
Fig. 5 (upper left plot) shows that differences exist between models
with regards to the extent towhich power production expands over the
next few decades. All of them agree, though, that economic develop-
ment is likely to be strongly associated with an increased electriﬁcation
of the energy system. Power production is likely to expand two- to
three-fold in the Core baseline between 2010 and 2050 according to
these models. The upper right plot of Fig. 5 demonstrates that with
high CO2 taxation all models except one (GCAM) ﬁnd that electricity
generation will be lower than in the Core baseline scenario. The expla-
nation for this reduction is that energy (and consequently electricity)
savings is considered a cost-efﬁcientmeans to achieve emissions abate-
ment under a climate-policy induced CO2 price. For GCAM, inversely,
the expansion of electriﬁcation is larger than under the business-as-
usual scenario, since it is assumed that the power sector and savings
are more suitable than other sectors to least-costly achieve CO2 emis-
sion reductions through technological change in response to stringent
climate policy with relatively high carbon taxation. The fact that
GCAM shows an expansion of electricity generation under the High
CO2 price scenario is probably also related to the electriﬁcation of previ-
ously un-electriﬁed sectors such as transportation (which may over-
compensate the savings in other sectors).
For the two abatement scenarios (lower two plots in Fig. 5), we see
that the upper level of growth in the power sector remains almost un-
changed with respect to the Core baseline, while the lower level of the
model solutions space reduces by about 1 PWh in 2050. Deepening
the CO2 emissions cut (that is, moving from the 20% to the 50% abate-
ment scenario) leads to several, but not all, models increasing their
levels of electricity generation by the middle of the century (GCAM,
TIAM-ECN and Phoenix). This again points towards diverging views
with regards to the potential of achieving emission reductions through
an electriﬁcation of energy supply. Our results regarding electricity pro-
duction and demand are consistent with those obtained at the global
level by other studies, which concluded that an accelerated shift to-
wards the use of electricity as ﬁnal energy carrier is generally a robust
feature of climate change mitigation scenarios (Krey et al., 2014;
Table 1
Main features of the models in our comparative study.
Model type/feature EPPA GCAM Phoenix POLES TIAM-ECN TIAM-WORLD
Basic model features
Economic coverage
and feedback
General Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium General Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium
Model type Optimization Market Equilibrium Optimization Simulation Optimization Optimization
Foresight Myopic Myopic Myopic Myopic Intertemporal optimization Intertemporal optimization
Calibration to
base-year shares
Calibrated production function Calibrated discrete-choice model Calibrated production function Calibrated discrete-choice
model
Base year calibrated
technology mix
Base year calibrated
technology mix
Representation of key regional resources
Solar power supply Regional supply curves Regional supply curves Fixed factor in CGEa Regional production limits Regional supply curves Regional supply curves
Wind power supply Regional supply curve Regional supply curves Fixed factor in CGEa Regional supply curves Regional supply curves Regional supply curves
Bioenergy Endogenous land competition Endogenous land competition Endogenous land competition Regional supply curves Regional supply curves Regional supply curves
CO2 storage supplies Fixed factor in CGEa No limits (with exception of Japan
and Korea)
Fixed factor in CGEa Regional supply curves Regional production limits Regional production limits
Expansion and share constraints for key technologies and representation of technological change
Coal-ﬁred power No constraints on expansion;
Capital vintaging; Exogenous and
price-driven technological change
No constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
No constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
No constraints on expansion;
No technological change
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Natural gas ﬁred
power
No constraints on expansion;
Capital vintaging; Exogenous and
price-driven technological change
No constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
No constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
No constraints on expansion;
No technological change
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
CCS Only in electricity generation;
Capital vintaging; Exogenous and
price-driven technological change
Includes BioCCSb; No constraints
on expansion; Exogenous
technological change
Only in electricity generation; No
constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
Includes BioCCSb; No
constraints on expansion; No
technological change
Includes BioCCSb; Growth
Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Includes BioCCSb; Growth
Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Hydroelectric power Fixed path; Exogenous
technological change
Fixed path; No consideration of
technological change
No constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
Fixed path; No technological
change
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Nuclear Capital vintaging; Exogenous and
price-driven technological change
No constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
No constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
No constraints on expansion;
No technological change
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Solar Only PV available; Capacity
expansion costs; Capital
vintaging; Intermittency costs;
Exogenous and price-driven
technological change
Capacity backup model;
Exogenous technological change
No constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
Distinction between PV and CSP
No constraints on expansion;
No technological change
Distinction between PV and
CSP
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Distinction between PV and
CSP
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Wind Only onshore options available;
Capacity expansion costs; Capital
vintaging; Intermittency costs;
Exogenous and price-driven
technological change
Onshore and offshore wind
lumped together; Capacity backup
model; Exogenous technological
change
No constraints on expansion;
Exogenous technological change
Distinction between onshore
and offshore wind;
No constraints on expansion;
No technological change
Distinction between onshore
and offshore wind;
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
Distinction between onshore
and offshore wind;
Growth Constraint; Exogenous
technological change
a Computable General Equilibrium.
b Models that have CCS in bioenergy (referred to as BioCCS) include CCS in electricity generation and fuel production.
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Fig. 1. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and industry in Latin America.
531B. van der Zwaan et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 526–542Weyant and Kriegler, 2014). The reason that EPPA and Phoenix do not
increase their electricity generation as much as the other models is
again that these CGEmodels have substantially lower overall energy de-
mand, induced by sizeable losses in GDP, which is matched by relatively
high CO2 prices (see Fig. 14).
For power production, innovative (e.g. renewable) technology de-
ployment under a climate change control regime is particularly perti-
nent, not only since it is among the largest and most rapidly growing
CO2 emitting sectors in Latin America, but also because it represents a
part of the energy system in which emission reductions can be realized
at costs often lower than incurred in several other sectors such as road
transportation or aviation (see also Clarke et al., 2014a, 2014b;
IEA-ETP, 2012). Fig. 6 describes the nature of possible technological
changes in the power sector according to our set of models: it shows
that not only substantial differences exist between models in terms of
the absolute level of electricity generation in Latin America in 2050,
for either the Core baseline or the three different climate change control
scenarios, but also in terms of its breakdown by type of resource and
technology. For example, CCS may play a small to negligible role in
some models (e.g. TIAM-WORLD in the High CO2 price scenario),
while its implementation may account for a third to about half of all
electricity generation in others (GCAM in the High CO2 price scenario
and the two abatement scenarios). Large differences also exist with
regards to the extent to which options like solar and wind energy may
be used (30–40% for POLES and TIAM-WORLD, and at most 10% for
EPPA and Phoenix). The results across models concerning hydropower
are pretty much consistent in that a large share is foreseen for thisoption in all cases (25–50% in all scenarios for all models). Obviously,
the three climate policy scenarios involve much less fossil-fuel based
electricity production (without CCS) than in the Core baseline, while
CCS deployment allows for a model like GCAM a substantial continua-
tion of the use of, in particular, natural gas for power production.
A closer inspection of individual technologies demonstrates more
clearly the electricity generation similarities and differences reported
by our set of models under varying types of climate policy regimes.
For example, Fig. 7 shows that hydropower today already contributes
with close to 800 TWh to annual electricity generation in Latin
America, and that in a business-as-usual scenario its role is likely to in-
crease over the decades to come, on average by 25% before 2050, ac-
cording to our models. Almost all models (except GCAM) agree that, if
any sort of climate policy is introduced, the amount of electricity pro-
duced through various hydropower options further expands, typically
by around 50% but perhaps by as much as 75% in 2050, as can be seen
from a comparison of theHigh CO2 price and the two abatement scenar-
ios with the Core baseline scenario. This outcome matches the current
trend for some countries. In the case of Argentina, for example, national
energy authorities are currently conducting a study to update the ﬁg-
ures for the country's hydroelectric potential, which could perhaps be
as high as around 40 GW (Di Sbroiavacca et al., 2016). The hydroelectric
power plant capacity installed in Argentina at present is around 11 GW,
that is, less than 30% of the total presumed national potential. In
Colombia today around 9 GW of hydropower capacity is operational,
on a total national theoretical potential of about 90 GW, which consti-
tutes an upper limit for the techno-economical potential (Calderon
Fig. 2. Primary energy consumption in Latin America.
532 B. van der Zwaan et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 526–542et al., 2016). In Brazil, hydropower currently takes up a large share of
electricity generation (an average of around 80% over the last ten
years (see EPE, 2014)). However, the remaining unexplored sites are lo-
cated in the Amazon region and thus face large local environmental con-
straints, which may hamper hydropower expansion in the country (see
e.g. Lucena et al., 2016). Among this large overall potential in Latin
America, particular opportunities exist for small- tomedium-scale hydro-
power plants (that today already account for over 10% of all operational
hydropower capacity). Hydropower is, like geothermal energy, among
the power production options for which a large theoretical availability
exists in many countries in Latin America, but the economic potentialFig. 3. Primary energy savings (supply side) in Latof the latter hasn't been exploited yet the way it has been for the
former.
Fig. 8 depicts simulated installed wind power levels until 2050 for
the four scenarios. In the Core baseline scenario wind power in several
models grows from close to zero in 2010 to hundreds of TWh in 2050,
while in other models wind energy potentials remain less exploited
until then. Most of these projections match current developments: ac-
cording to GWEC (the Global Wind Energy Council) by the end of
2013 about 4.8 GW of wind power was installed in Latin America,
most of which in Brazil (3.5 GW) with 4.7 GW in addition in the plan-
ning phase: this is admittedly much less than in other regions such asin America with respect to the Core baseline.
Fig. 4. Breakdown of primary energy consumption in Latin America by resource in 2050.
533B. van der Zwaan et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 526–542Asia, North America, or Europe, but still results in wind electricity gen-
eration of already close to 10 TWh (GWEC, 2014). All models concur
that wind power will grow substantially if climate policies are imple-
mented, reaching a level of at least a couple hundred TWh in 2050
under any of the three climate policies we inspect. For some models,
and especially in the high carbon tax scenario, wind electricity genera-
tion even reaches a level in 2050 close to the current level of hydropow-
er generation. The high levels of wind energy in essentially all models –
especiallywhen large relative shares are realized in individual countries
– undoubtedly require addressing issues such as intermittency, supply-
demand balancing and/or energy storage, and could also have impor-
tant land-use implications (see e.g. IPCC, 2011). Practically, these are is-
sues that haven't been extensively addressed in current energy systems
yet on the scale ultimately required in many countries, except for some
regions in theworld or European nations like Denmark, evenwhile sev-
eral studies have theoretically explored scenarios with high shares of
renewables through models with a high degree of bottom-up detail
(see e.g. Ludig et al., 2011;Mai et al., 2012; Sullivan et al., 2014). It is un-
certain today how aspects of integration will ultimately be tackled in
the ﬁnancial, social and institutional environment of the future. Devel-
opments regarding future technology costs and performance are also
uncertain, and add to the incertitude related to the costs of renewables
integration. All such uncertainties, and the extent to which the mostrecent technology cost change developments have been taken into ac-
count, imply relatively large differences across models in assumptions
regarding these variables, which in turn result in the large ranges
depicted in the plots for wind energy of Fig. 8 (see also Luderer et al.,
2014, for a detailed study for matters like these).
In Fig. 9 we see an even larger divergence between models of results
for solar power generation in Latin America under the various scenarios.
There is virtually no agreement as to whether solar energy makes a
chance to be broadly developed without climate policy, as pointed out
in the upper left plot of Fig. 9 (see for similar results IPCC, 2011, 2014).
In twomodels (EPPA and Phoenix) solar energy potentials remain largely
unexploited, even under stringent climate policy, the main reason for
which is that energy demand is substantially reduced as a result of high
GDP losses (and in response to high carbon taxation), much more so
than in the other (partial equilibrium) models. The underlying reason is
that EPPA and Phoenix are pessimistic on the options for low carbon elec-
tricity supply, including solar based technologies. In otherwords, relative-
ly less favorable solar energy cost and potential assumptions in EPPA and
Phoenix, in comparison to those in othermodels, form the explanation for
why this resource remains little exploited. At present it is, of course, un-
known which projection of solar power deployment will ultimately pre-
vail. Today, however, in several regions of the world and under different
policy settings (usually less stringent than those implemented in our
Fig. 5. Electricity generation in Latin America.
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ing sizeable subsidies, feed-in-tariffs or renewable portfolio standards
that stimulated learning-by-doing and economies-of-scale), solar energy
use is exponentially increasing, partly as result of the impressive cost re-
ductions materialized over the past years for especially PV technology.
On a global level, PV- and CSP-derived electricity generation combined
passed already the 100 TWh level in 2012 (IEA-ETP, 2014). Inspired by
this, the level of solar power production grows signiﬁcantly in some of
our models, from around zero today to hundreds of TWh in 2050 for all
three climate policy cases (and even more for POLES; see e.g. Grifﬁn
et al., 2014). Of course, it remains to be seen whether hundreds of GW
of solar energy capacity can realistically be deployed in Latin America by
2050, as challenges associated with such an extensive technology roll-
out – related to e.g. costs and intermittency, as well as land use needs
and environmental impacts – remain in several cases substantial at pres-
ent. Our results are largely compatible with the MACC-based ﬁnding that
at CO2 prices below approximately 100 $/tCO2, renewable options like
solar PV and CSP (and wind energy, as well as most CCS options for that
matter) become competitive with fossil-based power production options
(McKinsey, 2009).
The differences between our models with regards to the penetration
of renewable forms of energy underscore the need to advance modeling
techniques that more accurately capture their potential deployment pat-
terns (see e.g. Luderer et al., 2014). While probably critical to decar-
bonising the power sector, wind and solar energy resources are
intermittent and therefore impose challenges for their integration intothe power grid. Large-scale penetration of renewable energy requires a
fundamental transformation of the current operation of power systems
aswell as the deployment of technologies that allow formore operational
ﬂexibility such as storage options, improvements in transmission and dis-
tribution networks, and demand-response management tools. Especially
general equilibrium modeling approaches (but to some extent partial
equilibrium models as well) are currently unable to capture the ﬁne
time dynamics that determine the economics of renewable energy, and
therefore need to adopt stylistic assumptions to account for the costs of
intermittency that may limit its penetration (see e.g. Luderer et al.,
2014; Sullivan et al., 2013, for studies on this topic at the global level,
and Ludig et al., 2011; Mai et al., 2012; Sullivan et al., 2014, for regional
studies thereon). Also partial equilibrium energy systems models, even
while they tend to be more technology-rich, have yet to incorporate
some of the features (such as resource stochasticity and supply reliability)
that reﬁned power systems or dispatchmodels account for. There are also
possible economy-wide responses to the large-scale deployment of re-
newables that both types of models still have to grasp (including a wide
spectrum of changes or opportunities, such as employment creation, sec-
torial shifts, increased decentralization, and alignment of industrial and
manufacturing activity to variable power supply). Understanding the po-
tential changes and economic opportunities brought about by renew-
ables, both to the energy system and global and regional economies at
large, is an open area of research.
The prospects for nuclear power suffer from drawbacks related
to e.g. reactor accidents, radioactive waste, and proliferation of
Fig. 6. Breakdown of electricity generation in Latin America by resource and technology in 2050.
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as well as high investment costs, large capacity scales, and long
construction (lead) times. It has among one of its major beneﬁts
though that it is a low-carbon power production option (van der
Zwaan, 2013). Nuclear power has been investigated in several re-
cent integrated assessment model exercises, which yielded varying
ﬁndings regarding the prospects for this technology (Bauer et al.,
2012; Kim et al., 2014; Tavoni and van der Zwaan, 2011). In the
present multi-model comparison exercise for Latin America, we
ﬁnd that nuclear energy may beneﬁt from climate policy. This in-
cremental beneﬁt appears marginal, however, with regards to the
increase in nuclear power generation that all models already pro-
ject in the Core baseline scenario, as can be seen in the upper left
plot of Fig. 10. The extent of its possible expansion varies strongly
across models: GCAM and POLES yield much larger nuclear energy
expansion rates than the other models.
There is at present limited nuclear expertise and/or industrial ac-
tivity in themajority of countries in Latin America, andmany of them
do not possess adequate nuclear safeguarding & control institutions.
In spite of these shortcomings, some governments in the region
without prior experience in nuclear energy have recently expressed
interest in exploring the feasibility of domestic nuclear power pro-
duction, while several other governments have explicitly renounced
to adopt nuclear energy to date or question the local deployability of
nuclear power plants based on arguments such as risks for earth-
quakes. National nuclear energy development intrinsically involveslong lead times (typically 10 years for the construction of a nuclear
power plant, but sometimes decades), in comparison to those associ-
ated with other energy technologies. Hence it is probably unrealistic
to assume that nuclear power will be domestically produced over the
medium term in countries in the region other than Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico.
In the case of Argentina (with nuclear energy accounting for 6% of
installed electricity capacity, the highest share in Latin America), its
government is currently investigating a possible re-launch of nuclear
energy: a new reactor has just become operational and the construc-
tion of three additional nuclear reactors are under consideration. In
Brazil (with two reactors in operation and one under construction)
and Mexico (with two reactors in operation), likewise, no further re-
actor construction is planned for the near term. The ﬁgures for these
three countries are in agreement with the blue-shaded results
depicted in Fig. 10. The political and public acceptance inertia to
which nuclear power plant planning and construction is currently
subjected in these three countries, like has been the case in other
countries in the past, makes it unlikely that more than a two- to
three-fold expansion of nuclear power can materialize over the
next few decades in Latin America. Models like EPPA and Phoenix ap-
pear to best match this reality, while TIAM-ECN and TIAM-World
present more optimistic views – POLES and GCAM yield outcomes
that go beyond those of the other models, as a result of low nuclear
power cost assumptions and (absence of) nuclear power diffusion
deployment constraints.
Fig. 7. Hydropower generation in Latin America.
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It is broadly recognized that CCS technology is an important candidate
among GHGmitigation options available in principle to control global cli-
mate change (IEA-ETP, 2012; IPCC, 2005). CCS has therefore extensively
been subjected to analysis through integrated assessment models,
which almost invariably agree on the primordial importance of this tech-
nology (Azar et al., 2006; Edenhofer et al., 2010; Gerlagh and van der
Zwaan, 2012; Koelbl et al., 2014; Mikunda et al., 2014). Our model runs
corroborate with this view, and suggest that CCS may (need to) become
an important option to reach CO2 emission reductions, as demonstrated
in Fig. 11. This Figure shows that during the ﬁrst half of the 21st century
CCS deployment is likely to grow exponentially in each of the three
depicted climate policy scenarios (in the Low CO2 price scenario, CCS is
implemented as well, but to a much smaller extent). Substantial variety
exists, however, betweenmodels in terms of howmuch CCS could actual-
ly bedeployed, but the overall tendency is clear: in 2050, under ahigh car-
bon tax regime, CCS may involve hundreds Mt of captured CO2 per year,
while under a stringent CO2 emissions abatement regime its deployment
may capture (not avoid) an amount that exceeds a thousandMtCO2/yr. To
date, the high ambitions to demonstrate CCS technology on power plant
scale, let alone to deploy it on a broader industrial level, have largely
been left unmet. Among the reasons are the high costs associated with
CCS implementation and the infrastructural requirements to transport
CO2 in large quantities from capture location to storage sites. Public oppo-
sition to storage risks adds to the obstacles that CCS technology has expe-
rienced so far. It needs to be studied further whether and how LatinAmerica might be different from the rest of the world regarding the pos-
sible role of CCS; especially the situation regarding the CO2 storage poten-
tial in the region is important in this context.
3.5. Final energy consumption (demand side)
In addition to energy savings on the supply side, energy savings on
the demand side can contribute to achieving CO2 emission reductions.
Oneway to express the extent to which in ourmodels energy reduction
contributes tomeeting the goals set in the three climate policies scenar-
ios is to inspect the effect these policies have on ﬁnal energy consump-
tion, in comparison to the energy consumption level in theCore baseline
scenario, as is shown in Fig. 12 for four time steps until 2050. Clearly, as
the cross-model average lines show in this Figure, there is a tendency
that the more stringent the climate target gets (by moving from the
High CO2 price scenario to the 20% and 50% abatement scenarios), the
larger the role is played by ﬁnal energy savings technology on the de-
mand side. This tendency augments as time proceeds. Again, like with
primary energy savings, we see a clear clustering between two main
categories of models. General equilibrium models (EPPA and Phoenix)
project signiﬁcantly more ﬁnal energy consumption reductions than
partial equilibrium models (GCA, POLES and TIAM-ECN), essentially
for the same reasons as mentioned earlier. The former two models
treat ﬁnal energy as input to a macro-economic production function.
Hence energy demand reduction can be achieved by substitution with
other production factors, such as capital and labor, or by reducing eco-
nomic output. Since capital and labor are limited in supply, the large
Fig. 8. Expansion of wind power production in Latin America.
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losses in GDP.3.6. Technology deployment implications
Fig. 13 shows, for Latin America, annual capacity additions for the
short to medium term future (2010–2030 respectively 2030–2050),
for various potential low-carbon energy technologies, induced by the
emission reduction requirement of the 50% abatement (FF&I) scenario.
Also indicated is, as benchmark for the purpose of comparison, the tech-
nology deployment rate of several (conventional and renewable) ener-
gy technologies in Europe, the US and Latin America during the 1980s
and in the recent past (2002–2012). As one can see, the annual new ca-
pacity deployment intensity (expressed in GW/yr) that is projected for
solar energy in Latin America between 2010 and 2030 falls only some-
what short of that recently observed in Europe for the same technology,
and amounts to only little below the level observed for coal-based
power plants in Europe during the 1980s. It would on average be
much higher during the period 2030–2050 under this stringent emis-
sions abatement scenario. For wind energy also a large expansion is
projected for Latin America, but with deployment levels substantially
below those for solar energy (but this ﬁnding is strongly model-
dependent). Other low-carbon options such as hydropower and
biomass-based options (and to a lesser extent potentially also nuclear
energy and fossil-based CCS power production), as demonstrated bythe results reported in Fig. 13, also may receive (in some cases substan-
tial) impetus under this climate change mitigation scenario.
There is thus a signiﬁcant expansion opportunity for the
manufacturing and installation industry for the above-mentioned re-
newable energy options, in Latin America as well as elsewhere in the
world. This will require signiﬁcant public policy support in addition to
the economy-wide carbon tax or emissions caps that are examined in
our scenarios, including for example appropriate legal and regulatory
frameworks and enabling physical infrastructures in which these low-
carbon options can be implemented. It will also challenge the ability
of the private sector to expand at the necessary rates. In addition to in-
dustrial challenges, such technology diffusion implies infrastructural, ﬁ-
nancial, socio-political and institutional requirements not yet
experienced for several technologies at this scale in Latin America
(GEA, 2012; IEA-ETP, 2012; IPCC, 2011).Wilson et al. (2012) investigate
whether climate policy scenarios for future capacity growth of new en-
ergy technologies are consistent with historical evidence and ﬁnd that
future required low-carbon technological growth in the power sector
appears to be conservative relative to what has been evidenced histori-
cally. Differently from them, and probably because they use a different
analysis framework (expressing their ﬁndings in terms of speed-based
technology diffusion variables), van der Zwaan et al. (2013a) ﬁnd that
needed average annual capacity additions for a couple of low-carbon
energy technologies (solar andwind power) are the opposite of conser-
vative in historic terms, that is, they are several times higher than the
maximum average annual capacity additions rate observed in the past
Fig. 9. Solar power generation in Latin America.
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mate change. Here we support the ﬁndings by van der Zwaan et al.
(2013a): if global GHG emissions are going to be reduced substantially,
Latin America may need to prepare itself for capacity additions of some
renewable energy options in a few decades from now that are not only
much larger than what has historically been observed (for any energy
technology) in the region itself, but also substantially higher than (or
at least as much as) what has materialized in the past in Europe and
the US in terms of annual conventional or renewable energy capacity
additions. The body of literature on technology expansion rates is likely
to grow further over the years to come (for another recent article, with
similar conclusions, see e.g. Eom et al., 2014).
The multi-model comparison literature has recently spent substan-
tial effort investigating the incremental energy system costs required
for implementing low-carbon development strategies (see e.g. Kober
et al., 2014; McCollum et al., 2013; Tavoni et al., 2013; van der Zwaan
et al., 2013a). We here refer to Kober et al. (2015), as published in the
present special issue, for an in-depth analysis of the investment dimen-
sion of low-carbon technology deployment in Latin America.
4. Discussion, conclusions and policy & strategy implications
As we show in this study, the different experts behind our models
foresee substantially varying scales for the global contraction of high-
carbon energy resources, respectively the diffusion of low-carbon ener-
gy technologies. This is an expression of the multitude of pathways
available to reduce GHG emissions, in our case on the Latin Americancontinent. Other studies at the global level conﬁrm this diversity in pos-
sible climate mitigation pathways (see notably Clarke et al., 2014a,
2014b; IPCC, 2014). From a technology perspective, our model results
diverge in each of the scenarios we developed. This uncertainty in the
energy system transformation process yields important implications
for the public sector: except when local circumstances so dictate, for in-
stance because of a lack of certain energy resources at the national level
or because of policies driven by local priorities, policy makers may not
necessarily want to pick winners today, since we do not (yet) know in
all countries what the optimal or most cost-effective GHG emissions
abatement technology is (see e.g. the studies in this special issue on
the speciﬁc cases of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, by Di
Sbroiavacca et al., 2016; Lucena et al., 2016; Calderon et al., 2016; re-
spectively Veysey et al., 2016). Important though is to implement strin-
gent policies that can stimulate the market to decide which emission
reduction and technology deployment path to optimally take given lo-
cally pertaining circumstances.
Despite the large cross-model differences that we observe, also some
robust conclusions can be drawn, for example with regards to the impor-
tance of the power sector for implementing low-carbon energy technolo-
gies. Studies at the global level (such as in Krey et al., 2014; Weyant and
Kriegler, 2014) and regional level (Calvin et al., 2012; Clarke et al., 2012,
for Asia; Clarke et al., 2014a, 2014b; Fawcett et al., 2014, for the USA;
Knopf et al., 2013, for Europe) come to the same conclusion in this respect.
For large-scale low-CO2 electricity generation, renewables like solar and
wind energy dominate the present viewofmany analysts on future global
energy systems. Particularly in Latin America, other options could also
Fig. 10. Nuclear power generation in Latin America.
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tionwith CCS, see Calvin et al., 2016), hydropower and/or geothermal en-
ergy (see e.g. AriasGaviria et al., 2015).Nuclear power diffusion is likely to
be limited, even while certain prospects for its deployment cannot be
ruled out in a few countries in Latin America. In this articlewe particularly
study carbon taxes and abatement targets as two main economy-wide
policy interventions to stimulate low-carbon energy development. Dedi-
cated additional policy instruments can support these policies and the
emergence of markets for renewables, such as subsidies, RDD&D (Re-
search, Development, Demonstration and Deployment) programs, feed-Fig. 11. The use of CCSin tariffs and loan guarantees (but the simultaneous implementation of
such policy tools, such as subsidies and carbon taxes, yields the risk of cre-
ating economic inefﬁciencies). The public sector thus has a dominant role
to play in the transition towards a low-carbon energy system that contrib-
utes to mitigating climate change.
Our study bears also important strategic lessons for the private sec-
tor, since the annual capacity deployment intensity (in GW/yr) needed
for e.g. wind energy after 2030 needs to be similar to that recently ob-
served for wind power in the US. For solar energy it may have to be
higher than that observed between 2002 and 2012 in Europe and thein Latin America.
Fig. 12. Final energy savings (demand side) in Latin America with respect to the Core baseline.
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portunity for Latin American industry, as well as multinationals that
have Latin American countries among their clientele, this up-scaling
needs to be prepared for, and public policy needs to create a conducive
enabling environment. According to most modeling teams CCS consti-
tutes a signiﬁcant way to reduce CO2 emissions, so also this technology
proffers opportunities for industry, while necessitating preparations for
both the private and public sector. For all these technologies strong pol-
icy signals from government about support for low carbon-emitting en-
ergy sources (whether through economy-wide emission targets, carbon
intensity targets, or carbon taxes) and subsequent ﬁnancial returns
drive investment decisions in the private sector. The transition process
will be intrinsically uncertain. Not only does uncertainty abound with
regards to the technology type and diffusion extent of low-carbon ener-
gy alternatives that need to be deployed until 2050, but also concerningFig. 13. Average annual capacity additions (history EU, US and LA; short-medium future LA) f
scenario.the respective cumulative costs involved (for which we refer to Kober
et al., 2015).
The results from RDD&Dmay also steer the decision process regard-
ing where and how to commercially invest, hence industry could un-
dertake such RDD&D, potentially assisted herein through public
research endeavors. Both the public and private sectors could stimulate
and/or undertake technology-speciﬁc RDD&D, in order to prepare for
the changes the energy sector needs over the next few decades. For
Latin America such RDD&D could for example focus on BECCS options,
given the abundance of biomass options in the region, or solar energy
alternatives, given their prominence in our modeling results. As com-
plementary measures, or perhaps as viable alternatives, perhaps devel-
opment assistance or technology transfer agreements could bring about
beneﬁts without necessarily conducting the R&D part of RDD&D efforts
in Latin America.or various fossil-based and low-carbon energy technologies in the 50% abatement (FF&I)
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sued to allow for energy systems analysis that instructs both these sec-
tors on how to steer their planning and decision-making processes. This
is particularly true for several rapidly growing economies in Latin
America, since some of these countries have just embarked on an im-
portant mission to gradually decarbonize their national energy infra-
structures. Particularly interesting in this respect are economies, such
as those of Brazil and Colombia, that so far havemanaged to remain rel-
atively low-carbon despite substantial economic growth (largely as a
result of the large-scale use of hydropower), but whose challenge
henceforth is to avoid the risk of going fossil, stay low-carbon or even
further reduce their carbon intensity under continued socio-economic
progress (see Lucena et al., 2016 respectively Calderon et al., 2016). Sub-
jects abound that are yet to be explored by integrated assessment
models like ours. A question closely related to the theme of this article
is what the realistically feasible and/or technologically permissible
rates of change are in countries in Latin America that the required ener-
gy system transformation demands (see e.g. Riahi et al., 2013; van der
Zwaan et al., 2013a; Wilson et al., 2012, which deal with this topic in aAppendix A. Figure 14. CO2 prices for two emission abatement scenariosgeneric context). Related to this, an important ﬁeld of continuing re-
search related to the large-scale deployment of renewable energy in
view of its intermittent nature and the economic beneﬁts it could
bring to the region, as elsewhere.Acknowledgments
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